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Respect and Equality: 
Transsexual andTransgender RightsRights 
BY STEPHEN WHITTLE 
DISEMBODIED LAW: TRANS PEOPLE'S LEGAL (OUTER)SPACEl 
T he problem of who I legally am in the world I live in has been vexatious throughout my adult life. Like other 
transsexual people worldwide, I face an 
inadequate legal framework in which to exist. 
Some of us live within states and nations that 
recognise the difficulties and attempt to provide a 
route way through the morass of problems that 
arise; others barely, if at all, even acknowledge our 
being. We are simply 'not' within a world that 
only permits two sexes, only allows two forms of 
gender role, identity or expression. Always falling 
outside of the 'norm,' our lives become less, our 
humanity is questioned, and our oppression is 
legitimised. 
I have spent 28 out of my (to date) 47 years 
of life being known as Stephen. Prior to my 
adoption of the name Stephen, regardless of the 
name used for me by others, in my head, my day 
dreams and my plans for the future I referred to 
myself as Peter-a name I did not retain only 
because other people felt it was old fashioned. I 
have a beard, I wear a suit and tie to work - to not 
do so would be considered inappropriate. My 
partner and I have four children whom we chose 
to have together and the children all refer to me 
as Daddy. My driving licence, passport, library 
card and video-club membership have only ever 
referred to me in the male gender. Yet my 
national insurance pension scheme has only ever 
referred to me in the female gender; if I break the 
law I will go to a women's prison and to cap it all, 
I will depart this life as Stephen Whittle, female. 
I frequently face a dilemma in how I am to 
refer to myself in various settings. I am all too 
aware that I am not like most other men. For a 
start, if I refer to myself as a man, am I claiming 
some privileged position in the patriarchy? I 
actually do not want to claim that position; I often 
do not feel very privileged having been dismissed 
from jobs in the past because of my otherness. I 
have received hate mail and been excluded from 
social events both public and private. I find the 
fact that I cannot ensure my compulsory 
employment pension contributions are passed 
onto my partner of twenty five years standing, at 
best, demeaning of our relationship, at worst, an 
almost criminal extortion of money from me. 
Where is my privilege? 
Furthermore, I have a set of skills imbued in 
me as a child and teenager that other men simply 
do not have. Apart from sewing and household 
cleaning skills, I listen differently and I contribute 
to discussions differently. My childhood, like that 
of many I suppose, was unhappy but the reasons 
for that unhappiness were considerably different 
from those of most others. I know my attitude to 
other people and their lifestyles is one of almost 
excessive tolerance, as long as it involves no harm 
to others. I simply do not function in life with the 
same assumptions that other men are afforded 
through their upbringing and position of 
privilege. 
In social and medical texts, my sort of man 
has, over time, been referred to as a female urning 
and gynandrist (Krafft-Ebing, 1893), female 
transsexual (Stoller, 1975), and as a 'woman who 
wants to become a man' (Green, 1974). More 
recently, the common descriptor applied to me is 
that of 'female to male transsexual.' This is on the 
basis that I was born with genitalia that are 
regarded as female yet have undergone a bilateral 
mastectomy, take testosterone on a regular basis 
and I identify myself as male. Yet, am I a man? I 
prefer to refer to myself as a trans man-my own 
understanding is that I am a man who was born 
female bodied and, as I explain to my children, 
when I was big enough and old enough I made it 
clear to other people that I really was a man and I 
got it sorted out. This leaves me with a personally 
acknowledged situation that I am a different sort 
of man; I am a trans man with a transsexual status. 
With my status, a trans man, the UK 
government, because I have undergone some 
surgical gender reassignment, acquiesces to my 
request to be regarded as male (and not a man) 
for some social purposes but continues to 
maintain that for legal purposes I will be regarded 
as a woman. They choose not to make my life 
really difficult by making international travel or a 
driving check embarrassing, but they refuse to 
allow me many of the privileges that the law 
affords other men. At their worse, they insist that I 
am a woman. 
It is difficult to explain what being a bearded 
woman means to those who have never 
experienced that position. If I want to take out life 
insurance, I am forced to sit in front of an 
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insurance broker who does not know me 
from Adam (or Eve for that matter) and 
explain that I am a woman-which always 
raises the eyebrows. I never ever want to 
lose my job because the idea of sitting in 
the dole office waiting for the clerk to 
shout out 'Miss Stephen Whittle to cubicle 
6' makes me feel sick. I find it appalling 
that one of my children might one day 
have to register my death and on their 
return to collect the certificate will find I 
have been identified as Stephen Whittle, 
female, and that they will simply become 
'friend of the deceased.' 
The presumption that has been 
taken by most academic writers in the area 
is that I, and people like me, are 
demanding that we be legally recognised 
in the gender role in which we live. I am 
not sure if that is the case (though it may 
be for some)-and anyway, surely the role I 
live in is that of a trans man. I am willing 
to be a different sort of man, but I am not 
willing to be a different sort of woman 
because I have never been a woman. I 
transitioned into living as a man when I 
was 19 years old; therefore, as I often 
explain, on that basis I never reached the 
exalted state of womanhood-my 
experience was at most, that of being a 
different girl. But even if I was a girl, my 
experience was significantly different from 
that of other girls, ask my sisters and they 
will verify that. My life is different, it is the 
experience of being a trans man, and as 
such, discrimination has been perpetrated 
on me throughout my life in an entirely 
arbitrary manner. I have lost jobs not 
because I do not do them well but because 
my life history is that of a trans man. My 
partner is refused my pension not because 
my money is not good but because I have 
the life history of a trans man. 
Yet I am proud to be a trans man. I 
have surmounted great odds in life, I have 
had the pleasure of experiencing life in a 
very unique way, I have learnt a lot about 
tolerance and I have learnt a lot about 
bravery, hard work and commitment from 
the many other trans people I have met. 
Should it be so hard to be myself, to be a 
trans man, and the operative word in that 
is 'man'? This essay is in effect a plea to 
the law. I want to be able to be a visible 
trans man, to obtain my own identity and 
to be recognised as myself. But firstly, we 
must try to understand exactly what is 
taking place in order to ascertain what we 
can learn about the nature and 
construction of the legal culture, and the 
nature and construction of gender, in 
itself, by studying the legal problems that 
transpire because of the emergence of 
transsexualism in our society. 
LIVING IN OUTER SPACE 
For lrigary (1977) to have an identity 
which is not one's own, to be a sex which 
is not one, is to be excluded from the 
fullness of being: it is to be left precisely in 
a condition of dereliction. One is excluded, 
therefore, from the social contract within 
which men participate. A Rousseau'sian 
design of the social contract inevitably fails 
because the abstract individual of liberal 
democratic theory is, as Patemen (1989) 
has shown, in fact a man. lrigary is 
referring to women as women, women 
who never have their own identity-a 
woman's identity is defined through the 
social and cultural persona, they are in 
society but not of society. And this could 
be seen as an echo of the women in law; a 
woman is objectified through interven-
tionist law, she never is the law. As such, 
the egalitarian project of law is doomed 
through its own history, and the interven-
tionist project in law is doomed through its 
further objectification. Both deal in a 
mythical equivalency. 
The question then lies on whether 
there is any other form of project which 
can address the issue of the inadequacies of 
sexed / gendered law .... John Locke 
asserted in relation to the law that the use 
of words is to be the sensible mark of ideas; 
and the ideas they stand for are their 
proper and immediate signification (in 
Douzinas, Warrington, McVeigh 1991 : 228) 
Let us consider, then, the extent to 
which the UK's Road Traffic Offender's Act 
1988 (RTOA) is a 'sensible mark of ideas.' 
In the RTOA, it is a separate offence not to 
acknowledge, in court documents, a sex 
classification for yourself. Does this then 
require giving a legally correct classifi-
cation or is the choice of sex yours, as 
long as you give one? Do you have to give 
the one that the court would recognise, 
and anyhow, do you know what system 
the court would use to recognise it? 
If we consider the situation of the 
androgen insensitive woman, I (and 
medicine) refer.to her as a woman, yet do 
we know for the purposes of the law 
whether she is a woman, or whether she is 
a man? Is the classification the one 
afforded on her birth certificate, i.e. based 
on a cursory glance by a midwife to see 
whether there is a penis or not? In other 
words, a process that simply asserts 
whether someone is a 'man' or a 'not 
man.' Or should the law follow the three-
point test devised by Ormrod LJ in the 
case of Corbett2? Her chromosomes 
would be XY, her gonads would be un-
descended testes, and her genitalia would 
1 include a vagina? In the civil law, 
therefore, if the court uses the balance of 
probabilities test used for ascertaining 
evidential proof, I suspect she would be 
found to be a man on a 2:1 rule. However 
in the criminal court if we were to have to 
prove her sex, say for an offence involving 
soliciting, would the evidential burden of 
'beyond all reasonable doubt' mean that 
the court would be left with no sex site 
that they could place this woman in? 
As UK law currently stands the 
transsexual man, if born in Britain, would 
be legally classified as a woman for the 
purposes of marriage3, the criminal law4, 
Social Security and National Insurance 
benefits5, immigration6 and parenting?. 
For the purposes of employment he would 
be afforded the special status of 'woman 
who is transsexual', 8 which simply means 
a woman with special protection for 
having an identity peccadillo. If the trans 
man were born outside of Britain then his 
identity in each of these areas of the law 
would be dependant upon the nation 
state he was born in.9 Yet, the trans man 
would be classified on his driving licence 
(through the codification system) as a 
man. If the trans man is required to give 
his 'sex' to the court if he is facing a 
driving disqualification, presumably the 
purpose of that disclosure is to ensure that 
the driving licence records of the correct 
person are marked up. Should he say he is 
a man or male, or should he say he is a 
woman or female? What is the 
requirement of the law? It is no defence to 
a criminal act to argue that you had no 
knowledge of the law, or that you did not 
understand it. Where lies Locke's 'sensible 
mark of ideas,' the logic of the law is truly 
at times an ass. ♦ 
1. A version of this essay was published as 
"The Becoming Man : The Law's Ass 
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Reclaiming Genders: Transsexual Grammars 
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9. For example; if born in Ontario in Canada 
he would be a man for the purposes of 
immigration into Britain, yet he would be 
woman for the purposes of marriage. (see 
the comments earlier in this chapter on the 
cases of C(L) v C(C) (1992) and B. v A. 
(1990). If born in Holland he would be a 
man for all purposes except (probably) the 
criminal law. 
